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Part	 XIV: Cross-Cultural Morality 
26.	 Cross-Cultural Research on 
Kohlberg's Stages: The Basis 
for Consensus 
CAROLYN POPE EDWARDS 
When Lawrence Kohlbcrg (1%9. 1971a) claimed that his moral stages were 
culturally universal, he ensured that a storm of controversy would greet his theory. 
He then intensified the controversy by further claiming that preliterate or semiliter­
ate village peoples would generally fall behind other cultural groups in their rate 
and terminal point of development due to a relative lack of 'role-taking opportuni­
ties' in their daily lives. 
Moral values arc known to vary so greatly from culture to culture that a 
universal. invariant sequence in development or moral judgment is a provocative 
claim. Furthermore. to characterize the difference between the moral judgment of 
people in traditional face-to-face societies versus modern. complex. national states 
as a difference in 'adequacy' of moral judging (Kohl berg. 1971a) seems to violate 
norms of inter-cultural respect and ethical relativism. 
Kohlbergs statements have been met by many theoretical statements at­
tempting to refute aspects of his conclusions or assumptions about cultural uni­
versality (see. for example. Bloom. 1977; Buck-Morss. 1975; Edwards. 1975. 19B2; 
Shwedcr , 19R2a; Simpson. 1974; Sullivan. 1977). Equally of importance, the theo­
retical controversy has stimulated much empirical research intended. at least in 
part. to test the cross-cultural claims. Cross-cultural research is the only empirical 
strategy that can actually establish or discount the universalizabiliry of the theory, 
and for that reason it has been actively pursued. This paper will review the status 
and current progress of comparative studies of moral judgment. 1 will attempt to 
show why the work as a whole can be considered productive, tending toward in­
creased rather than diminished understanding of the moral reasoning of human­
kind. I will answer each of the following. pivotal questions below with a 'Yes. but 
. , .' argument. Finally, 1 will try to show how, as comparative research has 
proceeded to become increasingly elaborated in theoretical intent and sophisticated 
in design and methods of analysis, it has quietly established its position as a viable 
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field of research. Controversy remains. of course. hut it is a fruitful one, and there 
is a solid core of issues upon which we can reach reasonable consensus. 
Questions Central to Establishing the Universality of Kohlberg Moral Stages 
Is the dilemma interview method a valid way of eliciting the moral 
judgments of people in other cultures') 
2 Is the standard scoring system appropriate and valid for cross-cultural usc? 
3 Is cognitive-developmental theory useful for understanding psychological 
development in comparative cultural perspective? 
THE VALIDITY OF THE INTERVIEW METHOD 
For the morel! dilemma methodology to be considered valid for either a particular 
research study or comparative research in general requires three things. First. the 
specific dilemmas used in research must be 'real' to the particular people involved, 
that is, they must raise issues and pit values important to the respondents. This 
criterion requires either development of new dilemmas appropriate to particular 
cultural contexts or adequate adaptation of Kohlberg's Standard Interview. 
Secondly, dilemmas and probing questions must be well translated into respon­
dents' native language. and respondents' answers must be translated without 
distortion back into the language of scoring. Thirdly. the interview methodology 
itself must be adequate to the sensitive task of eliciting respondents' 'best'. 
'highest", and most 'reflective' reasoning about morality (Edwards, 191-) I). The third 
criterion is the most subtle and difficult to determine, but it is absolutely critical to 
the success of the cross-cultural endeavour. 
Research to date is uneven in quality according to the first criterion, but recent 
research can surely be judged generally more satisfactory. Most researchers have 
opted to adapt Kohlbergs standard stories rather than to create entirely new 
dilemmas, in order to take advantage of standard scoring systems. This practice 
assumes that standard stories (if adequately modified in details to fit the local 
setting) present real and relevant dilemmas to people everywhere because they 
share certain universal moral concerns, such as affectional. property and authority 
issues. Such an assumption seems to me a fair one, with a notable exception. True 
hunter-gatherer societies do not contain headmen or chiefs; nor do they contain 
formal courts or governing institutions. People in these societies would not be 
expected to make sense of problems pitting 'law' and 'life', or 'authority' and 
'conscience' . 
Regarding the first criterion. we can feel most confident about research 
conducted by investigators who are thoroughly familiar with the cultures studied. 
We can expect such researchers to have the best sense that the dilemmas used are 
relevant and adequately adapted. The early research studies (especially Grimley, 
1973; Kohlberg, 1969; Saadatrnand , 1(72) are flawed by serious weakness in terms 
of trying to cover too much ground (four or five cultural settings each) with little or 
no ethnographic description provided for each sample and its moral values. In 
contrast, many of the recent researchers have focused in depth on their own society 
or cultural group (c.g., Lutz Eckensberger. Germany; Jean-Marc Samson, French­
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speaking Canada; Y. H. Chern. S. W. Cheng and T. Lei. Taiwan: Muhammed 
Maqsud , Nigeria; Bindu Parikh. India). In other cases. researchers have gained 
thorough familiarity of the cultures they studied. For example. Sara Harkness lived 
as an anthropologist for three years in Western Kenya. and John Snarey provides 
detailed ethnographic description of the Israeli kibbutz where he based his work. 
Although these researchers have not generally commented on how well dilemmas 
have seemed to 'work' in their studies. when they do. their comments have been 
generally positive. For example. Harkness. Edwards and Super (191'1) say. 'AII of 
the men readily accepted this task and became quite involved in giving their 
judgments' (p. 59R). 
Only a few researchers have experimented with creating entirely new dilem­
mas. I found (Edwards. 1<)75, 1<)7R) that Kenyans were intensely interested and 
provoked by a new dilemma, called Daniel and the School Fees. However, I did 
not systematically compare subjects' level of responses to the new versus standard 
stories. Charles White and colleagues (197H) found in pilot work in the Bahamas 
that there were no stage differences in response to their new versus the standard 
dilemmas, so they did not pursue its use. By far the most original approach has 
been taken by Benjamin Lee (1973.1976). Lee. an American of Chinese descent, 
departed completely from the standard stories and developed a series of 'filiality' 
stories to study moral reasoning in Taiwan. Filiality is a core Chinese value. of 
course, and Lee reports (personal communication) that subjects, especially those of 
the older generation, scored higher on tiliality than standard stories. because 
'fairness' was not an important issue for them. Lee's research illustrates how 
broadening the interview base to issues outside the core concerns of Westerners 
can enrich, not undermine, the structural approach to moral development. Further 
work. in my opinion, should involve quantitative and qualitative comparison of 
people's responses to original versus standard dilemmas. Such an approach would 
fully and adequately meet criterion one and lead to an improvement or elaboration 
of the theory. 
Criterion two concerns adequacy of translation. Only one set of German 
researchers has taken the notable step of translating not only dilemmas but also the 
scoring manual into another language (Eckensberger , Eekensberger and Rein­
shagen, 1<)75 -6). Most other researchers have translated the dilemmas into 
subjects' native language. then translated answers back into English for scoring. 
Their procedures have probably met at least minimal standards, especially when 
investigators, such as Jean-Marc Samson. are bilingual. with their first language the 
target non-English language. They have considered carefully problems of translat­
ing ethical terminology. For example, Parikh (19HO) states, 'The first lO translations 
were checked by a professor of English and a native of Gujarat. A list was made of 
those words for which it was difficult to get equivalents in English and this list was 
then discussed with a professor of Gujarati and another of English' (p. 1(33). 
However, translation is a fascinating subject in its own right that deserves 
closer inspection and analysis. No researcher. for example. has yet compared 
responses to a dilemma as translated by several different people. or compared 
moral maturity scores given to the same interview as translated into English by 
several different translators. Past researchers. quite rightly perhaps. have been 
more interested in simply taking the initial step of seeing whether moral judgment 
scores distribute themselves in a predictahle or reasonable way over a target sample 
of people. 
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Criterion three concerns whether the interview method is able to elicit the very 
best and most mature reasoning about moral problems in cultures other than our 
own. This is an extremely difficult question, and common to research on cognition 
and social cognition in general, not just Kohlbergian research. The crux of the 
problem revolves around those groups who seem to show least high-stage reason­
ing. Findings from a large number of studies (reviewed in Edwards, 19K\. 19K2) 
have indicated that moral judgment Stage 5, and perhaps even full-Stage 4, arc not 
found in interviews with prelitcrate or semiliterate adults who live in relatively 
'traditional', small-scale societies, such as isolated peasant or tribal communities. 
Are these stages really missing, or are the results an artifact of testing bias? There 
are, in my opinion, good theoretical grounds for thinking that Stage 3 may be the 
stage at which the judgment of village adults stabilizes. The underlying structure of 
Stage 3 corresponds well to the social and moral order of a society based on 
face-to-face relations and a relatively high level of normative consensus (Edwards. 
1975, 198\. 1982; Nisan and Kohlberg. 19K2). However, it is still important 10 
consider carefully the fundamental problems that exist with eliciting moral 
reasoning by asking people to reflect upon moral dilemmas. 
The moral dilemma interview is best seen as a way to elicit a particular part of 
people's moral thinking. their 'conscious reflections' rather than intuitive or implicit 
knowledge about morality (cf. Pool. Shwedcr and Much. 19l:\3). The interview 
stimulates people to explain their justifications and to self-reflectively volunteer 
criteria for decision-making. Do adults in all types of societies have this capacity? 
'Yes'. we can answer. considering the fact that adults in a wide range of cultural 
groups studied so far seem 10 enjoy dilemma discussions. They find it congenial to 
play the role of what Kenyans called the 'moral elder and formulate their wisest. 
most considered opinion about posed, hypothetical problems. 
Richard Brandl, a philosopher who many years ago studied Hopi ethical 
systems. similarly concluded that ethical principles are probably culturally univer­
sal. He inferred thai 'wrong' had a true ethical meaning to the Hopi: 'If I were 
normal. impartial. and fully informed. I should feel obligated not to perform X' 
(Brandt, 1954. p. 1(9). Although Brandt had to piece together his picture of the 
Hopi's implicit principles from rather brief answers to formal dilemmas sup­
plemented by many related remarks in other conversations. he believed that his 
results make 'a highly unfavorable beginning for any person who thinks the 
"moral" concepts of primitive peoples are quite different from. and vastly more 
simple and less elevated than our own' (p. 9K). 
Nevertheless. Kohlberg's highest stages are consistently missing in the inter­
views from certain groups. and this may relate to the level of formal discourse 
required for them. John Gibbs (1977, 1979; Gibbs and Widaman, 1982) has put 
forward the case that Stages 5 and 6 of Kohlbergs system are different from Stages 
1 to 4. While Stages I to 4 are genuine developmental stages, Gibbs feels that 
Stages 5 and 6 are something else-namely, 'second-order' thinking about moral­
ity, 'meta-ethical reflections' on the decision-criteria constructed at an earlier 
stage-a kind of thinking made possible primarily by higher education. Gibbs, a 
close collaborator of Kohlberg, proposes to constructively revise the system by 
re-Iabelling Stages 1 and 2 as 'immature', Stages 3 and 4 as fully 'mature', and Stages 
5 and 6 as a 'theory-defining level of discourse'. In a somewhat similar vein, 
Eckensberger and Reinshagen of Germany (1977. 1981), on the basis of theoretical 
analysis and their reading of the comparative literature, have suggested that Stages 
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J to 3 are the basic developmental structures. Stages 4,4/5 and 5, they speculate, 
represent horizontal decalages of the first three structures into less obvious content 
areas (social systems rather than concrete others). 
Both of these sets of suggestions arc very important from a comparative 
perspective. Although many adults in all societies seem able to step into the 'moral 
elder' role (Stage 3 or .+) in reflecting upon moral problems, they are not equally 
able to assume the 'moral theorist' role, as required for Stages 5 and 6. As 
anthopologist Richard Shweder ( !lJK2b) has said, 'Children and most adults in most 
culture" are not very good at spontaneously articulating the distinctions. ideas, and 
concept" underlying their sense of morality. Most people do not know how to talk 
like a moral philosopher' (pp. )~~Sl). While every cultural environment is indeed 
'packed with implicit messages about what is of importance, what is of value, who 
counts as a person' (Shwcder , IlJ~2b, p. )6: also see Read, ISl))), nevertheless 
most people in traditional societies may not he able to discourse at the 'theory­
defining level' about what they know and think (Horton. 196K). Still, if critics are 
correct that the first 3 or .+ stages arc the core developmental ones. then we can 
comfortably conclude that the moral dilemma method has shown itself surprisingly 
congenial to a wide variety of cultural groups with social systems at very different 
levels of political and economic complexity. 
THE VALIDITY OF THE SCORING SYSTEM 
The standard scoring system depends upon the theoretical notion that basic. 
universal moral judgment structures can he differentiated from highly variable, 
culturally-specific contents. Cross-cultural data. therefore, should 'fit' thc scoring 
system. Problems can arise from two types of data: (1) data which seem to match 
most closely the criterion statements of one stage (c.g.. Stage 2). hut which really 
seem to flow from the social perspective or underlying structure of another stage 
(e .g., Stage 3): and (2) data which arc 'unscorablc, i.c .. do not match any of the 
standard scoring categories. Insofar a" empirical data present a serious challenge to 
either of these two varieties, they suggest that the scoring system is invalid or at 
least in need of revision. 
Finding IIIIV anomalies. however. is not necessarily had news for the theory. 
The scoring system is regarded by cognitive-developmental researchers as a living 
being. and new data that suggest way" to improve the scoring system can represent 
good news. The task of constructing and revising scoring categories that adequately 
distinguish form from content has been a continual one. Hard-to-score data arc 
actually helpful if they suggest concrete ways to improve the scoring system. 
Past researchers have reported that their cross-cultural data arc generally 
readily scorable. Inter-rater reliabilities. where determined. have achieved 
acceptable standard" of agreement. Researchers have commonly presented illustra­
tive material to show how the reasoning of their target group had culturally-typical 
contents yet revealed an easily recognizable underlying structure. Most data 
labelled as 'unscorable, especially from child subjects. consisted merely of brief 
'yes' or 'no' statements, or responses that were too incomplete to reveal their 
underlying stage (hut for an exception, sec Tomlinson, ISl~3). 
Recently. however. researchers have begun to report upon and critically 
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cxanunc hard-to-score data from adult subjects and to suggest that these data are 
problematical. All of thc-«- scoring problems refer to amhiguitics in Stage~:;, 4 and 
:'. For example, Snarcv ( 1l)~2) and Snarcv. Reimer and Kohlbcrg ( 19~4) analyze 
difficult-to-score reasoning by Israeli kibbutz respondents. Tiley dcscr ibe how some 
subjects hlind-scorcd as Stage 4 or 4!.'i were determined hy a 'culturally sensitive' 
scorer to he Stage:'. They conclude that the scoriru; manual needs to he 'fleshed out 
with cultural Iv indigenous cx.unplcs, especially at the higher stages (Snarcy, 1l)~2, 
p. 317). Cheng and Lei (19~J) provide examples of Taiwanese reasoning that they 
thought difficult-to-score: some of the material seemed to he either tr ansitionul 
bctwcenJ and 4. or between 4 and S, but the categories and distinctions provided in 
the scoring manual did not allow accurate determination. Thev concluded, 'More 
clear delineation of the structure of the stage~ and better designed probing 
questions seem to be in need' (p. ]6). 
In research in Kenya. I too found several examples of hard-to-score inter­
views. While most of the interviews were rcadilv scored, the most difficult ones 
were long and complete hut arguably either Stage:; or 4. These were interviews 
with mature adults who had not attended formal schooling beyond the primary 
grades. The men were 'community moral leaders'. that is, respected elders often 
called to advise at hearings between local disputants. 
To illustrate the way that interviews reflecting a non-Western frame of values 
and perspective upon societv can be difficult to score-s-and to add to the growing 
literature seeking to elaborate constructively the scoring system--Iet me present 
two cxarnplcs. The excerpts raise the fundamental question of whether Stage 4 
merclv requires a rough appreciation or society's need lor institutionalized roles. or 
whether it requires a full-blown understanding of the organizational aspects of a 
social structure and the operation of a leg;" systcm (paraphrase of Cheng and Lei, 
19~1, p. 16). What the Kenyan elder- have is a clear and elaborated vision of fair 
and reasonable rules for running a prosperous extended family, based on 'unity', 
'respect', and 'understanding', key Kenyan traditional values. 
From an interview with a Kikuyu man. age :'3, with three years of schooling 
(Edwards. 197:'; dilemma is Daniel and the School Fees): 
(jIlCl{lOn. In ~eneral. should a wown-up "1Il obcv all of his parents' wishes') 1'\'11\, or whv not" 
Alii ,,'cr: The parents should not authorize Daniel to educate his brothcr', son. They should 
only advise him. Daniel has a home to 1001-. after since he left his parents, and it's a complete 
house with one person as head, not two. So he should not ohev his parcnr- hut should consider 
their advrccs. 
(Jiles/ion: Is it more important for Danivl to maintain harmonious relations with his wile. or 
with his brother and parents" Why" 
Allswcr: Once one is married. we sal' in Kik uvu socictv that. 'lie is out of his parents' 
hands . . ' The husband will he the Chairman and the wife the Treasurer, and as such she will 
control the rcsourccv. That Is whv Daniel', wife wants Ito usc the Iarnilv moncv] tll put her son in 
school. 
{j1l£'stiulI: Would vou condemn Daniel It he just moved awav tll the citv and did not help hi, 
brotbcrx son? 
AnIwa: We cannot condemn Darnel because it's ri~hl lie can onlv carry \\ irh him one 
home, not two. lie can offer help if he can in other ways. If WL' draw a picture like this, we sec 
that there arc different generations being founded. Daniel is now verv tar from Karnuu Ihis older 
brother who put Daniel himself through school]. 
Parents 
Daniel~lKamau 
Daniel's Son_..J Karnaus Son 
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From an interview with a Kipsigis man, age 55, unschooled (Harkness, 
Edwards and Super, 19~1; dilemma is adaptation of Joe story). 
Question: Should Jumc« refuse to give his father the muncy"
 
AIl.III'er: If his father is a squanderer. then he shouldn't be given, But if he keeps it well. the
 
rather is like a bank, and he should keep it. 
Question: Should the father always direct the son') 
Answer: For the son to refuse to take his father's advice shows that he is not well cared for 
y	 But when you [a father) convince him [your son] by telling him, 'Do this sort of thing because this 
will earn us our living. You didn't do it this time, but do it next time.' then the child will complyI 
since you did not command (shout at) him and so both of vou will be in good unity and 
11 
understanding of each other. 
e (juestion: Which is worse, for a father to break his promise or tor a son') 
g Answer: Ill' the father breaks his word] it will cause hatred because the son will be angry. 
saying. 'I wanted to follow my own intentions, but my rather cheated: he permitted me and then 
refused me. Now I don't want to hear more of his words. He can't love me and is unable to 
protect me.' So it is bad. [However], the one for the son is worse. Imagine a child disobeying my
s 
own words. is he really normal" Rules arc mine and I want him to follow, e.g. 'Do this thing 
s to earn you a living', as I did follow my father's rule, also Father's bad deeds arc revealed 
y when he docs not care for his children That man i, like a drunkard whose children do not 
n sleep at home because he drives them away when not sober. The man doe, not have rules which 
work and so it is bad. But if he has good functioning rules, he is able to keep his Iamilv. The 
maize will be growing because or his good work. Then it ix clear that his family is well looked 
s 
after. 
g 
It In conclusion, there seems a clear consensus that the scoring system has 
4 provided a useful tool for analyzing cross-cultural data, However. subtle distinc­
'I' tions between the higher stages need to be further clarified, and form and content 
a need to be further differentiated to broaden definitions of stages or levels beyond 
I. Stage 3. 
ir 
THE USEFULNESS OF THE THEORY FOR EXPLAINING HUMAN 
g DEVELOPMENT 
As explained in the earlier sections of this paper, recent years have seen the 
accumulation of many studies focused on groups other than the dominant majority 
culture of the USA, These studies allow us to consider our final question, whether 
cognitive-developmental theory has proven useful for understanding individual 
development within or between cultural groups, 
The within question is surely less controversial and includes two parts, First, do 
the central claims of the theory about development (especially invariance of 
sequence) hold up in cross-cultural studies? Second, do specific examinations of 
moral judgment in relationship to experiential or background variables lead to 
increased understanding of the processes facilitating development? We cannot 
examine each of these questions in detail. but we can indicate the general shape of 
an answer. 
In my recent survey, I found the following studies focused on groups from 
outside the mainstream US culture (also see review in Snarey. 1982): 
The Americas 
USA Alaskan Eskimo (Saxe, 1970) 
Puerto Rican (Pacheco-Maldonado. 1972) 
1I
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Canada Germanic Hutterite (Saadatmand, 1(72) tom 
French (Marchand-Jodoin and Samson, 19~2; Samson, \9~3) the 
English (Sullivan, \975; Sullivan and Beck, \975; Sullivan, No 
McCullough and Stager. 1979; Sullivan and Quarter. 1(72) pres 
Bahamas (White, 1975, 1977; White, Bushnell and Regncrner. 197~) exce 
Guatemala (Saadatrnand, 1(72) by i 
Honduras (Gorsuch and Barnes, 1(73) avai 
Mexico (Kohlberg, 19(9) they 
Asia thro 
India (Parikh, 1975. 19~(); Saraswathi, Saxena and Sundaresan, 1(77) 
Iran (Saadatrnand. 1(72) 
Israel Kohlberg, with Bar Yam, 1971b: Snarcy, 19~2; Snarcy. Reimer 
and Kohlbcrg, 19~4) 
Hong Kong (Grimley, 1973, 1(74) 
van; 
undi 
the 
10m 
Japan 
Taiwan 
(Grimley, 1973, 1(74) 
(Cheng and Lei, 19~1; Chern, 197K: Kohlherg. 1969; Lee. 1973, 
POSl 
whe 
1976)
 
Thailand (Batt, 1974. 1(75)
 
Turkey (Nisan and Kohlbcrg, 
197~) 
Africa 
Kenya (Edwards, 1974. 1975, 
19~1) 
Nigeria (Maqsud , 1976, 1977a. 
Zambia (Grimley, 1973, 1(74) 
Europe 
France (O'Connor, 1974, 19i'\() 
Finland (Helkarna. 19~ 1) 
Germany (Eckenshcrgcr , 19~3; 
ger, 19~2) 
19~2; Turicl , Edwards and Kohlberg, 
197~; Harkness, Edwards and Super, 
1977b. 1979. 19~2) 
stirm 
indiv 
Giclcn , 19~2; Villenave and Eckensber­ abilil 
indiv 
Grear Britain	 (Grimley. 1973, 1974; O'Connor. 1974, 19~(); Simon and reses 
Ward, 1973; Simpson and Graham. 1971; Tomlinson, grou 
19~3; Weinreich, 1977) 
KohlA ustralia and Oceania betwNew Zealand	 (Moir , 1(74) 
note'Two types of	 societies still represent critical nussmg cases: (1) foraging posit(hunter-gatherer) societies, which lack social classes or hierarchy and also formal 
political and legal institutions; and (2) societies such as those of Eastern Europe, Wt 
USSR, and Peoples' Republic of China, which are complex nation-states but based a 
on non-capitalist economies. A further serious weakness of the literature is that the uru 
sueonly longitudinal cases in the above list are from the Bahamas, French Canada, judIsrael, Great Britain and Turkey. The great majority of studies are cross-sectional. 
sta 
due to the enormous expense and difficulty of conducting longitudinal work. 
The proposition of invariant sequence requires that stage development be 
stepwise and progressive, with stage regressions and stage skippings no greater than relati 
expected by chance (measurement error). All of the cross-sectional studies have cross· 
I 
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found average moral maturity and/or upper-stage-range to increase with age during 
the childhood and adolescent years (with the exception of the Hutteritc sample). 
No studies have found any 'missing' stages between the lowest and highest stages 
present in a sample. Furthermore. the longitudinal studies (with the probable 
exception of Tomlinson 's. 19S3. British sample) have supported these conclusions 
by indicating no significant amounts of stage regression over time. Thus, while the 
available data cannot positively demonstrate invariant sequence, taken together 
they strongly suggest that development change is generally gradual and positive 
throughout the childhood and adolescent years, in a wide variety of cultural groups. 
Most investigators. naturally. conducted their research with broader questions 
in mind than merely invariant sequence. Taking advantage of the natural range of 
variation in social life worldwide. they have been able to gain increased leverage on 
understanding experiential influences. For example. a number of researchers from 
the list above have been able to show that the following experiential factors relate 
positively to moral judgment. iNote: the dates of the studies are provided only 
when necessary for the reader): 
socioeconomic status (Grimley: Kohlberg with Bar Yam; Nisan and Kohlberg: 
Simpson and Graham: Turiel et al.); 
residentialjactors, e.g.. living in city or village. or city versus kibbutz (Gorsuch 
and Barnes: Nisan and Kohlberg: Snarcy: Turicl et al.): 
educational level (Ratt: Edwards. !lJ75): 
school experiences (Edwards. IlJ7~: Maqsud. all studies: Marchand-Jodoin and 
Samson; Sullivan. 1975; Sullivan and Beck); 
parental discipline. warmth or identification (Parikh: Saadatrnand: Simpson 
and Graham). 
These studies taken together converge to suggest that moral judgment level is 
stimulated hy at least three general types of experiences. that increase: (I) an 
individual's contact with a diversity ofpersonal or cultural values; (2) an individual's 
ability to reason in formal or school-like ways about moral issues: and (3) an 
individual's tendency to lake as one's reference group a complex society. The 
research allows a genera! consensus that conditions that lead to development in one 
group arc comparable to conditions that lead to development in other groups. 
Finally. we return to the issue with which this paper opened: how valid is 
Kohlbergs theory for comparing moral development (and moral adequacy) 
between people of different cultural groups? 
Even on this controversial issue a certain consensus may be achievable. It is 
noteworthy that in response to criticism. Kohlberg has revised his own earlier 
position. He now states (in Kohlbcrg. Levine and Hewer. 19K")): 
We do not believe that the comparison of one culture to ;1l1other in terms of IIIor aI development is 
a theoretically useful strutcgy for the growth of scientific knowlcunc.. It is difficult to 
understand what a valin concept of 'comparative moral worth 01 culture' 11lIght be. but in any case 
such a concept could not be established Oil the ba,is of a comparison of mcan-, on our moral 
judgment assessment scale. There is no direct way 111 which group averages can he translated into 
statements 01 the relative moral worth of groups (p. IU). 
In other words. cross-cultural differences have nothing to do after all with the 
relative moral worth or adequacy of moral judging. Moral judgment stages. from a 
cross-cultural point of view. arc simply not achievements for which higher is 
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necessarily better. Rather, Kohlbcrg's theory and methods offer just one useful 
way to study developmental growth in wisdom or 'conscious reflectiveness' in moral 
decision-making. Certainly they do not begin to encompass all that we would like to 
know in terms of understanding how human beings across the spectrum of world 
cultures develop in the capacity to make moral choices. Nevertheless, Kohlbergs 
theory and methods have surely generated a productive line of comparative 
research that has become more sophisticated, multidimensional and theoretically 
lively over time. 
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